How
We Know the Bush Administration
Fixed the Intelligence Around the Policy
In
2002 and early 2003, George W. Bush repeatedly told Americans that he
did not want war with Iraq and that war would be a “last resort.” I
knew instinctively from his behavior and statements back in 2002 that
Bush had already decided to attack Iraq. And, of course, it’s now been
documented in books by Paul O’Neill, Richard Clark, and Bob Woodward,
as well as in the Downing Street memos and other first hand testimony.
The Iraq war was not forced upon the U. S.; it was an elective war.
For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass
destruction, [as justification for invading Iraq] because it was the
one reason everyone could agree on. (Paul
Wolfowitz, Vanity Fair interview, May 28, 2003) Judge whether good enough [to] hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at the same
time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden]….Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things
related and not. (Donald
Rumsfeld notes, Philadelphia Daily News, Sept. 11, 2001) From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein
was a bad person and that he needed to go. Going after Saddam was topic
"A" ten days after the inauguration - eight months before
Sept. 11. (former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill,
CBS’ 60 Minutes, Jan. 11, 2004) I wouldn't ease the sanctions. And I wouldn't try to negotiate
with him. I'd make darn sure that he lived up to the agreements that
he signed back in the early '90s. I'd be helping the opposition groups.
And if I found, in any way shape or form, that he was developing weapons
of mass destruction, I'd take them out. I'm surprised he's still there.
I think a lot of other people are as well. (Candidate George W. Bush, December
2, 1999) From
a marketing point of view you don't introduce new products in August. (Bush Chief
of Staff, Andrew Card, as quoted by Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Aides
Set Strategy to Sell Policy on Iraq," New York Times, September
7, 2002, From the very beginning,
there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that
he needed to go.
(Former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, the primary source for Ron
Suskind’s book The Price
of Loyalty). In
the book, O’Neill goes on to say he was surprised at the meeting that
questions such as "Why Saddam?" and "Why now?" were
never asked. It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the
tone of it. The president saying ‘Go find me a way to do this,. For
me, the notion of pre-emption, that the U.S. has the unilateral right
to do whatever we decide to do, is a really huge leap.”
(Former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, the primary source for Ron
Suskind’s book The Price
of Loyalty). C
reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible
shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction
of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and
facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience
with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the
Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of
the aftermath after military action. (The “Downing
Street Memos,” July 23, 2002 Meeting of Tony Blair and his Senior Staff) On
September 12th, I left the video conferencing center and there, wandering
alone around the situation room, was the president. He looked like he
wanted something to do. He grabbed a few of us and closed the door to
the conference room. "Look," he told us, "I know you
have a lot to do and all, but I want you, as soon as you can, to go
back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he's
linked in any way." "I was once again taken aback, incredulous,
and it showed. "But, Mr. President, al Qaeda did this." "I
know, I know, but - see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to
know any shred . . .". (Richard Clarke, in Against All
Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror) Rumsfeld
was saying that we needed to bomb Iraq," Clarke said. "And we all said ... no, no. Al-Qaeda
is in Afghanistan. We need to bomb Afghanistan. And Rumsfeld said there
aren't any good targets in Afghanistan. And there are lots of good targets
in Iraq. I said, 'Well, there are lots of good targets in lots of places,
but Iraq had nothing to do with it.' (Richard Clarke, in Against All Enemies: Inside
America’s War on Terror) I
expected to go back to a round of meetings [after September 11] examining
what the next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what
we could do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series
of discussions about Iraq... I realized with almost a sharp physical
pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage
of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq ... By the
afternoon on Wednesday [after Sept. 11], Secretary Rumsfeld was talking
about broadening the objectives of our response and "getting Iraq." (Richard Clarke, in Against All
Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror) According
to Richard Clarke, the Bush Administration knew from the beginning that
there was no connection between Iraq and 9/11, but created the misperception
in order to push their policy goals. [Rumsfeld, Cheney and Bush]
did know better. They did know better. They did know better. We told
them, the CIA told them, the FBI told them. They did know better. And
the tragedy here is that Americans went to their death in Iraq thinking
that they were avenging September 11th, when Iraq had nothing to do
with September 11th. I think for a commander-in-chief and a vice president
to allow that to happen is unconscionable. (Richard Clarke, in Against
All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror) Intelligence “analysts never said there was an imminent threat"
from Iraq before the war. (CIA Director George Tenet, speech, Feb. 5, 2004) I don't think they [WMD] existed. What everyone was talking about
is stockpiles produced after the end of the last [1991] Gulf War, and
I don't think there was a large-scale production program in the '90s.
(David Kay, former chief weapons inspector
of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, Reuters, Jan. 24, 2004) The U.S. should assert its military dominance over the world to shape
“the international security order in line with American principles and
interests,” push for “regime change” in Iraq and China, among other
countries, and “fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major
theater wars….While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate
justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in
the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.” “Rebuilding America’s
Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century,” The Project
for the New American Century [members include Dick Cheney and Donald
Rumsfeld], Sept. 2000) The
only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that
Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction.
In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action
as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing
Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the
aim of American foreign policy. (Letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998, signed
by 18 members of the The Project for the New American Century,
including future Bush administration members Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton,
Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle) |