Archive of The Andy Finn Show - October 2, 2006
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17:42 |
Part 1 - Politics & Social Issues: Bob Woodward's State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III: the Bush Administration's Approach to Terrorism Before 9/11; "The Best and the Brightest," Part II - Arrogance Run Amuck |
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12:50 |
Part 2 - Politics & Social Issues: Bob Woodward's State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III: Vice-Decider Dick Cheney Turns Regularly to Kissinger for Advice - What's Wrong with this Picture? A Review of the Nixon-Kissinger Handling of Vietnam; Kissinger, Cheney, Rumsfeld All Learned 'Stay the Course' from Vietnam; Misreading Nationalism |
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16:55 |
Part 3 - Politics & Social Issues: McNamara's '10 Lessons of Vietnam;' They Eerily Apply to Iraq, Too; The Republicans Will Learn from Iraq What the Democrats Learned from Vietnam |
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10:14 |
Part 4 - Politics & Social Issues: Bob Woodward's State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III: A Rumsfeld Replacement Was Debated in 2004; Rumsfeld's Management Style, Misjudgments, and Denials |
Bonus Content:
Excerpts from Robert McNamara's April 25, 1995 speech at Harvard University
In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
(Excerpts:)
And it's from that review that I identify our failures, and it's from that review that I draw from the lessons, which I believe will be applicable and relevant to the 21st century. Now, I'm going to go through. There are eleven of them. The last chapter is devoted to the ... (inaudible) There are eleven.
I'm going to go through them very, very quickly, in a sense very superficially. But, I want you to understand just the outline of my thinking, and then we can get into the questions. And if you wish, we can go further into them.
The first point is we misjudged them, and I think we're misjudging today the geo-political intentions of our adversaries. In that case, it was the geo-political intention to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong supported by China and the Soviet Union. And we exaggerated the dangers to the U.S. of those adversaries. And I think we're continuing to do that. We were talking at dinner about the defense subject. I doubt that anybody in the room recognizes the defense budget of the U.S. proposed by the Clinton administration for the years say 1977/78 in constant dollars is only three-percent less than President Nixon's in the height of the Cold War. My God, are we not continuing as I suggest today as we did then to exaggerate the dangers to the U.S. of some of these threats? I think so.
Second mistake. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. We're still doing that. We saw them as having a thirst for a determination to fight for freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within that country.
Thirdly, we underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate people. In this case, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Then we underestimate the power of ... (inaudible) to motivate a people to fight and die for their people. Ho Chi Minh said, and I believe he meant it, they would have fought another ten years. Just a week ago the Vietnamese completed a study they've been working on for some time and the number of fatalities. I couldn't believe the figure; I heard it over French radio. They say that excluding the South Vietnamese military that were killed which they didn't have data on, that they believed that 3,200,000 Vietnamese, civilians and military north and south were killed. And he said they were prepared to kill another 10 million. I think they were. We didn't believe that. We totally misunderstood the motivation, the dedication of a people motivated by nationalism.
Fourthly, our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of a history, culture and politics of the people in that area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders. We might have made similar misjudgments regarding the Soviets during our frequent confrontations. During the seven years I was Secretary, we confronted the Soviets over Berlin in August '61, over Cuba in October '62, and over the Middle East in June of '67.
We avoided wars in all those cases in part because we had available to us at the most senior levels of the government the advice of Soviet specialists, Tommy Thompson, Chip Bowles, George Kennan. They spent their lives studying the Soviet people-- Its culture, its history, their politics, their personalities. And their advice proved invaluable. And I would say that the heroes of the Berlin crisis in '61, the Missile Crisis in '62, the Middle East in '67, the heroes were those Soviet specialists who helped President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk and myself and the National Security Advisor make their decisions, we did. No Southeast Asia counterparts. And this is a statement that I've made-- There's no statement I've made over radio, TV or newspaper interviews in the last two weeks since I've been commenting publicly that has gone more-- or call it derision, not just disbelief, derision, than this state. There were no Southeast Asian counterparts for senior officials to consult with during those periods.
Fifth, forsaken lesson. We failed then as we have since to recognize the limitations of modern high technology military equipment and forces in doctrine in confronting unconventional highly motivated people's movements. We were about to make that mistake; thank God we haven't yet, in Bosnia. And we ... (inaudible) well to adapt our military tactics and our political programs to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
Sixthly, we failed and we came damn close to making this mistake in connection with the Gulf War. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of large scale U.S. military involvement. In that case, in Southeast Asia, before we initiated the action.
And seventh, after the action got underway, and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we fail to retain popular support, in part, because we hadn't explained fully what was happening and why we had to do what we did. In effect, we had to begin to try to cut our losses and shift tactics and strategy, and the public didn't understand and they weren't with us.
A nation's deepest strength lies not in its military strength, military force. It lies in the unity of its people. We didn't have it. And I would suggest we probably didn't deserve it given the way we handled it.
Eight, we didn't recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are on a mission. To this day we seem to act in the world as though we know what's right for everybody. We think we're on a mission. We aren't. We weren't then and we aren't today. And where our own security is at stake, I'm prepared to say act unilaterally, militarily. Where our security is not at stake, not directly at stake, narrowly defined, then I believe that our judgment of what is in another people's interest, should be put to the test of open discussion, open debate, and international forum. And we shouldn't act unilaterally militarily under any circumstances. And we shouldn't act militarily in conjunction with others until that debate has taken place. We don't have the God-given right to shape every nation to our own image. (applause)
Well, you can clap but we're still trying to do it, and that's sad. One question you could ask is how do we move from where we are to where we ought to be? And that's very difficult and I'm depending on you all to play a major role in that. That's why you're here; that's why I'm here talking to you.
Ninth, we didn't hold to the principal that U.S. military action other than in response to direct ... (inaudible) to our own security should be carried out only in conjunction with international forces who are going to share in the cost. And I don't mean financial cost, although I certainly include financial cost, but I mean primarily the blood cost, the blood risk.
In the Gulf cosmetically we had support of others, but 90% of the blood loss that the Chiefs predicted--thank God their predictions were wrong--they predicted very substantial fatalities in the Golf. Thank God they're wrong. But, had they occurred, 90% of the blood loss would have been ours and 75% of Japan's oil is imported from the Gulf.
Tenth, we failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems which there are no immediate solutions, certainly no military solutions. Now, for me that's very hard to say. I spent my life problem solving. I believed every problem had a solution.
These are excerpts from Robert McNamara's April 25, 1995 speech at Harvard University Click the link to read the entire text to In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam
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